

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 03747 042257Z

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ACTION ACDA-19

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S E C R E T USNATO 3747

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: SPC JULY 2 DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION

REF: A) USNATO 2566; B) STATE 109162

SUMMARY: SPC JULY 2 CONSIDERED FIFTH REVISION OF IS VERIFICATION PAPER, INLIGHT OF U.S. COMMENTS. FRG CONTINUED TO STRESS ITS INTEREST IN IMITING VERFICIATION MEASURES OTHER THAN NTM'S TO SMALLEST POSSIBLE AMOUNT, AN AMOUNT WHICH WILL DEPEND ON EFFECTIVENESS OF NTM'S. UK REP STATED HIS AUTHORITIES HAVE JUDGED NTM'S ALONE ARE NOT ADEQUATE, AND CITED FOUR REASONS. SPC AGREED TO SOME CHANGES IN IS PAPER. END SUMMARY

1. SPC ON JULY 2 CONSIDERED FIFTH REVISION OF IS VERIFICATION PA PER (REF A) IN LIGHT OF U.S. COMMENTS ON GERMAN AMENDMENTS (REF B). THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS KEYED TO PARAS IN FIFTH REVISION.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03747 042257Z

2. PARA 4-BELGIAN AND NETHERLANDS REPS OPPOSED GERMAN ADDITION (LAST SENTENCE IN BRACKETS). THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE RATIONALE FOR PROPOSING A NEGOTIATING POSITION ON VERIFICATION FOR THE FIRST PHASE ONLY. BELGIAN REP SAID HIS GOVERNMENT IS CONVINCED

OF NEED FOR VERIFICATION NOT BY ONE MEANS ONLY BUT BY VARIETY OF ELEMENTS RESULTING CONCORDANCE, FRG REP STATED THAT VERIFICATION DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT. SINCE WE ARE ONLY STUDYING FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WE SHOULD ONLY STUDY THE VERIFICATION MEANS APPROPRIATE TO IT. HE STATED FRG'S STRONG INTEREST IN THIS PARA GIVEN FRG'S SPECIAL POSITION AND THE NEED TO AVOID ENHANCING IT. KASTL (COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN) INDICATED SPC WOULD RETURN TO THIS POINT.

3. PARA 5-UK REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES HAVE JUDGED NTM'S NOT ADEQUATE FOR FOUR REASONS: FIRST, RELYING ENTIRELY ON NTM'S COULD GIVE RISE TO TENSIONS IN ALLIANCE IF SOME THOUGHT THE U.S. HAD INFORMATION IT WAS NOT PASSING ON. SECONDLY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS A LONG TERM TOOL. IT MAY TAKE A LONG TIME TO CONCLUDE THAT SOMETHING IS GOING ON. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE VITAL INFORMATION IMMEDIATELY RE BREACH BY OTHER SIDE. THIRDLY, MATERIAL DERIVED BY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MIGHT NOT BE USEABLE WITH OTHER SIDE BECAUSE OF DANGER OF COMPROISING SOURCES. FOURTHLY, NTM'S CAN BE UPSET AND WE ARE OPEN TO DECEPTION BY OTHER SIDE. THEREFORE, NTM'S NEED TO BE SUPPORTED BY VERIFICATION SYSTEMS OF KIND DICUSSED IN IS PAPER. UK STILL BELIEVES ALLIES NEED OVERT INSPECTION WITH MOBILE TEAMS.

4. FRG REP SAID UK WAS NOT QUESTIONING WHETHER NTM'S COULD DO THE JOB BUT WAS SAYING THAT FOR A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL REASONS, ALLIES NEED COMPLEMENTARY MENAS. HOWEVER, FRG AUTHORITIES HAD INSTRUCUTED HIM TO REPEAT THE QUESTION PREVIOUSLY ASKED BY FRG: TO WHAT EXTENT WILL NATIONAL MEANS BE ABLE TO VERIFY UNAUTHORIZED RE-INTRODUCTIONS INTO NGA? UK REP REPLIED THAT UK WAS IN EFFECT SAYING IT HTINKS NTM'S ALONE CANNOT DO THE JOB, FOR THE FOUR REASONS STATED.

5. UK REP, REFERRING TO FRG'S QUESTION TO U.S. ABOUT SUFFICIENCY OF NTM'S, SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WERE STRUCK BY ANNEX E OF U.S. APRIL 30 PAPER WHICH INDICATED LIMITATIONS OF NTM'S. THIS SEEMED AN ANSWER TO FRG QUESTION. NETHERLANDS REP WONDERED TO WHAT EXTENT
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03747 042257Z

FRG VERIFICATION POSITION WOULD CHANGE IF FRG GOT FULL AND DETAILED ANSWER FROM WASHINGTON. FRG REP REITERATED FRG INTEREST IN LIMITING POLITICAL DANGER OF VERIFICATION MEASURES OTHER THAN NTM'S TO SMALLEST AMOUNT: AMOUNT OF OTHER VERIFICATION ACCEPTABLE TO FRG DEPENDS ON EFFECTIVENESS OF NTM'S

6. PARA 6(G)-FRG COULD ACCEPT U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DELETION OF "PARTICULARLY IF APPLIED TO A WIDER GEOGRAPHIC AREA" IF FOLLOWING WERE INSERTED AFTER FOLLOWING SENTENCE (WHICH ENDED WITH "QUANTIFIED PRECISELY"): "IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE EXTENT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA TO WHICH VERIFICATION MEASURES WOULD BE APPLICABLE." FRG SAID THIS REMOVED ACCENT FROM GEOGRAPHIC AREA BUT STILL STATED RELATIONSHIP. U.S. REP REMINDED SPC OF U.S. INTEREST IN NOT REOPENING QUESTION OF NATO INSPECTORS IN WMD'S AND WARSAW PACT INSPECTORS IN

THE U.S. HE SAID HE WOULD, OF COURSE, REPORT THE FRG LANGUAGE BUT HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT RAISE THE SAME PROBLEM. SPC AGREED TO DROP FIRST ALTERNATIVE IN PARA 6G.

7. PARA 7-FRG AGREED TO U.S. REQUEST TO DROP FIRST SENTENCE IN FRG ADDITION.

8. PARA 8-NETHERLANDS REP SAID HE COULD NOT AT THIS POINT ACCEPT DELETION OF SECOND SENTENCE.

9. PARA 9-NETHERLANDS REP NOTED PARA 9 ORIGINALLY DUTCH IDEA. HOWEVER, NETHERLANDS HAS CONCLUDED THERE WILL NOT BE CONCRETE MEASURES OUTSIDE NGA DNT HEREFORCE COULD DROP WHOLE PARA. ITALY AND BELGIUM AGREED. HOWEVER, GREEK REP THOUGHT IT PREMATURE TO DROP THIS PARA AND TURKEY AND NORWAY SUPPORTED HIM.

10. PARA 10-UK REP NOTED UK THINKS THERE SHOULD BE LIAISON OFFICERS WITH MOBILE TEAMS. UK IS HOWEVER SYMPATHETIC WITH PROBLEMS OF ACCEPTABILITY AND BELIEVES SEVERAL ADMINISTRATIVE STEPS COULD HELP REMEDY THESE PROBLEMS, E.G. LIAISON OFFICERS NOT IN UNIFORM, NOT RESIDING IN THE COUNTRY BEING INSPECTED, ETC.

11. PARA 18-SPC AGREED AD REFERENDUM TO DELETE THE THIRD AND FOUR SENTENCE PER FRG REQUEST.

12. PARAS 23 AND 25-U.S. RESERVED ON GERMAN PROPOSED AMENDMENTS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 03747 042257Z

13. PARA 28-FRG REP AGREED AD REFERENDUM TO U.S. REQUEST FOR DELETION OF LAST SENTENCE IN FRG ALTERNATIVE SINCE HE BELIEVED IT DID NOT ADD ANYTHING. SPC AGREED TO THIS AND TO DELETION OF FIRST ALTERNATIVE.

14. SPC WILL RETURN TO IS DRAFT AFTERNOON OF JULY 5.
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